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  Abstract 
Previous research suggests that people draw inferences about their attitudes and preferences 
based on their own thoughtfulness. The current research explores how observing other 
individuals make decisions more or less thoughtfully can shape perceptions of those individuals 
and their decisions, and ultimately impact observers’ willingness to be influenced by them. Three 
studies suggest that observing others make more (versus less) thoughtful decisions generates 
more positive reactions when a choice is difficult, but more negative reactions when a choice is 
easy.  In essence, people perceive the quality of others’ decisions to be greater when other 
individuals engage in the right amount of thinking for the situation.  These assessments then 
affect observers’ own decisions and openness to influence. 
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“[He] was the very first plastic surgeon I visited and I knew right away I didn’t need to look any 
further…” – Customer Testimonial, novaplasticsurgery.com 
“I performed an extensive search of board certified plastic surgeons in the DFW area…” – 
Customer Testimonial, realself.com 
 
Who has more appeal and influence: Someone who makes decisions with considerable 
thought and analysis or someone who takes virtually no time and seems to make decisions 
effortlessly? Imagine searching for a plastic surgeon and encountering the two actual 
testimonials presented above. Which would have more influence over your own decision?  Now 
imagine standing in line at a café. As you wait, a customer ahead of you gives his decision a 
great deal of thought, discussing his order with a friend and asking the barista for help. After 
careful deliberation, he orders a nonfat latte. The next customer orders an iced Americano with 
what appears to be no deliberation whatsoever. Which of these individuals made a better 
decision? Who do you like more? How would your own choice be influenced by each of these 
individuals?   
This research examines how observing other individuals make decisions with more or 
less thought affects (a) our inferences about those individuals, (b) our inferences about the 
decisions they make, and (c) our own subsequent decisions. Our central prediction is that other 
individuals’ decision thoughtfulness has a dynamic impact on observers’ reactions, such that 
observers sometimes prefer more and sometimes prefer less thoughtfulness in others. 
Furthermore, we posit that observers’ willingness to be influenced by another person’s 
decision—and even by that person’s advice on other topics—can be shaped by whether they 
believe that person put the right amount of thought into making it. Thought Calibration 4 
 
Decision Thoughtfulness 
People make numerous decisions every day, from what to eat for breakfast to what brand 
of appliance to purchase. In some cases, people make these decisions without much thought. For 
example, an individual needing a new microwave might purchase the first model she sees 
without even reading the product label. In other cases, individuals devote more thought to their 
decisions; for example, painstakingly comparing different microwaves before deciding. 
Substantial research has explored the impact of one’s own decision thoughtfulness—that is, the 
amount of time and effort devoted to making a decision—on social and evaluative judgment (see 
Ariely & Norton, 2011). For instance, considerable literature has examined whether individuals 
are more certain of their attitudes when they generate them quickly and effortlessly versus more 
slowly and thoughtfully (see Tormala, Clarkson, & Henderson, 2011). 
Despite extensive literature documenting the impact of one’s thoughtfulness on one’s 
own judgments or decisions, little research has examined the inferences people draw from 
others’ decision thoughtfulness.  Researchers have explored others’ decision thoughtfulness as a 
driver of moral perceptions (Tetlock et al., 2000), but not as a possible source of perceived 
decision quality and social influence.  This lack of attention is surprising given the frequency 
with which people observe others making decisions. For example, in grocery and hardware 
stores, patrons frequently encounter others deliberating between different products before 
choosing one over another. More generally, most people have observed others deliberate very 
little or at great length, over both important and mundane decisions. What effects do these 
observations have? Are people more attracted to and influenced by others who are high or low in 
decision thoughtfulness?   
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The Current Research 
We investigate how perceptions of the amount of thought that another individual devotes 
to a decision affects evaluations of that individual, the decision itself, and ultimately observers’ 
openness to being influenced by the decision maker. One reasonable prediction is that observing 
an individual make a quick (low thought) decision fosters favorable evaluations, because it 
suggests that the optimal decision is clear or that the individual trusts her gut reaction. To the 
extent that individuals perceived as confident and decisive are more influential (see Sniezek & 
Van Swol, 2001), it is possible that low-thought decisions might boost observers’ openness to 
being influenced by the decision maker. Alternatively, observing an individual devote substantial 
thought to a decision could lead to more favorable evaluations and openness to influence, as it 
suggests that the individual is more thorough and the decision more carefully considered. For 
example, individuals who contradict themselves can sometimes gain persuasiveness by seeming 
to be more thoughtful (Reich & Tormala, 2013).  Furthermore, people are more confident of their 
attitudes when a message source appears to have considered both the positives and the negatives 
of a product (Rucker, Petty, & Briñol, 2008). To the extent that such consideration seems more 
thoughtful, these results could suggest that more thought is evaluated more favorably. 
In contrast to either main effect prediction, we propose that the effect of decision 
thoughtfulness depends on whether the context calls for more or less thought. In particular, we 
investigate the moderating role of decision difficulty. Our core hypothesis is that observers 
perceive others as engaging in the “right” amount of thinking—that is, as being better 
calibrated—when their level of thoughtfulness matches the apparent difficulty of the decision. 
We define calibration not in terms of any objective standard of accuracy, but rather as the extent 
to which decision makers are perceived to attune their thoughtfulness to the difficulty of a Thought Calibration 6 
 
decision. We posit that this calibration enhances perceptions of the decision and decision maker, 
and increases observers’ willingness to follow the decision maker’s actions. There is an 
extensive literature on matching effects in persuasion, suggesting that matching the tone or 
content of a persuasive appeal to message recipients’ processing style or psychological 
orientation generally increases persuasion by boosting perceived fit, fluency, and/or involvement 
(see Mayer & Tormala, 2010). The current research investigates a different type of matching, 
exploring whether decision makers can increase their appeal and influence by matching their 
decision thoughtfulness to the apparent difficulty of a decision context. 
Consider the case in which one observes someone making what should be a difficult 
decision—for example, choosing between products that differ on non-aligning dimensions 
(Zhang & Fitzsimons, 1999). We hypothesize that observers will form more favorable 
impressions of this individual and the decision when it is made thoughtfully. Indeed, difficult 
decisions require greater thought, and taking time to make a careful decision should foster 
perceptions of better analysis. By contrast, when seemingly difficult decisions are made without 
much thought, observers might infer a lack of due diligence, which could attenuate perceived 
decision quality, produce less favorable impressions of the decision maker (which can coincide 
with perceptions of poor judgment; Johnson, 1989; Wakimoto & Fujihara, 2004), reduce the 
desirability of the chosen item, and even dampen observers’ openness to influence from the 
decision maker.  
Now consider the case in which one observes someone making what should be an easier 
decision—for example, choosing between products that are identical on every dimension except 
color. We suggest that observers form more favorable impressions of this decision, and the 
decision maker, when it is made less thoughtfully. Particularly when a decision seems as though Thought Calibration 7 
 
it should boil down to a gut feeling or simple preference, less thoughtfulness might be perceived 
as better matching the demands of the situation. This inference may promote the perception that 
the target individual is a “good” decision maker (e.g., not an “overthinker”), which could 
increase observers’ openness to being influenced by that individual.  
In essence, we postulate that observers will look more favorably upon, and be more 
influenced by, other individuals and their decisions when those individuals display thought 
calibration. We present three experiments exploring this possibility. Study 1 assesses influence 
by measuring participants’ willingness-to-pay for an item chosen by the decision maker. Studies 
2-3 assess interest in receiving the decision maker’s advice in future decisions. Across studies, 
we predict more favorable evaluations of the decision maker and more influence under 
conditions of calibrated thinking. 
Study 1 
  Study 1 provided an initial test of the thought calibration hypothesis. We predicted that 
participants would evaluate an individual and his decision more favorably when that individual 
was more thoughtful when making a difficult decision, and less thoughtful when making an easy 
decision. Study 1 also investigated whether such calibration could impact observers’ willingness-
to-pay for the target’s chosen item—a proxy for influence.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
One hundred sixteen undergraduates, participating in a computer experiment for 
monetary payment, read a vignette in which an individual named Ted went to the store to 
purchase a microwave. Participants read that Ted was considering two options, and they received 
a list of attributes for each. Participants next learned that Ted chose Microwave 1, after which Thought Calibration 8 
 
they reported their perceptions of Ted, his decision, and their willingness-to-pay for Microwave 
1. 
Independent Variables 
Decision type. We manipulated whether the microwave comparison was easy or difficult 
by varying the number of dimensions along which the microwaves differed (Appendix A). In the 
easy condition, the ovens were identical on every dimension except color. The ovens differed in 
color in the difficult condition, but in addition they differed along several other non-aligning 
dimensions. In a pre-test asking participants to indicate how difficult it would be to choose 
between the microwaves in each condition (1: Not Difficult At All; 7: Very Difficult), participants 
perceived the decision to be more difficult in the difficult (M = 4.54, SE  = .24) rather than easy 
(M = 2.60, SE  = .29) condition, t(107) = 5.13, p < .001. In a separate pre-test asking participants 
how much thought would be required to choose between the microwaves (1: Very Little Thought; 
7: A Lot of Thought), participants reported that the decision required more thought in the difficult 
(M = 4.81, SE  = .12) rather than easy (M = 2.14, SE  = .11) condition, t(174) = 16.29,  p < .001. 
Decision thoughtfulness. Beneath the attribute lists, we manipulated the target’s 
thoughtfulness. In the low thought condition, participants read: “Ted gives each option a very 
brief look and then quickly lifts his choice into the shopping cart.  He doesn’t put much time or 
thought into this decision, taking just 30 seconds to decide.” In the high thought condition, 
participants read: “Ted gives each option a thorough examination and then, after very careful 
consideration, lifts his choice into the shopping cart.  He puts a great deal of time and thought 
into this decision, taking nearly 10 minutes to decide.” 
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Dependent Measures 
  Decision quality. Following the scenario description, we assessed perceived decision 
quality with two questions: How good a decision do you think Ted made?  How wise do you think 
Ted’s final decision was? Responses, provided on 1-7 scales (not at all – very), were averaged (r 
= .80, p < .001). 
Willingness-to-pay. Next, participants typed the dollar value that they would be willing to 
pay for Microwave 1.  
Liking.  Finally, participants completed three items assessing their evaluation of the 
target: How much do you think you would like Ted? How favorable is your impression of Ted as 
a person? How much would you like to be Ted’s friend? Responses, provided on 1-7 scales with 
higher ratings indicating more liking, were averaged (α = .87). 
Results
 
  We submitted each dependent measure to a 2 (decision type: easy or difficult) × 2 
(thoughtfulness: high or low) ANOVA in this and all subsequent studies. 
Decision Quality 
  Analysis of the decision quality index revealed a main effect for decision type, F(1, 112) 
= 6.68, p < .02, but not decision thoughtfulness, F(1, 112) = 2.10, p < .16 (Table 1). Most 
importantly, the predicted interaction emerged, F(1, 112) = 13.25, p < .001. High (versus low) 
thoughtfulness enhanced perceived decision quality when the decision was difficult, F(1, 112) = 
13.21, p < .001, but this tendency reversed when the decision was easy, F(1, 112) = 2.36, p < .13.   
 Willingness-to-Pay  
There were no main effects on willingness-to-pay, Fs < 1.62, ps > .20, but the predicted 
interaction emerged, F(1, 112) = 5.77, p < .02.  Participants tended to show greater willingness-Thought Calibration 10 
 
to-pay when Ted was more (versus less) thoughtful about a difficult decision, F(1, 112) = 3.56, p 
< .07, and when he was less (versus more) thoughtful about an easy decision, F(1, 112) = 2.29, p 
< .14, suggesting greater influence under conditions of thought calibration. 
Liking 
There were no main effects on liking, Fs < 1, but again the predicted interaction emerged, 
F(1, 112) = 7.48, p < .01. More (versus less) thought fostered liking under difficult decision 
conditions, F(1, 112) = 4.00, p < .05, whereas less (versus more) thought fostered liking under 
easy decision conditions, F(1, 112) = 3.50, p < .07. 
 
Study 2 
  The results of Study 1 were consistent with our hypothesis that people perceive the 
quality of others’ decisions to be greater when others calibrate their thoughtfulness to the 
difficulty of a decision. Study 1 also revealed that this calibration fosters social influence—as 
reflected by the willingness-to-pay data—and increases liking of the decision maker. We submit 
that the underlying basis for these effects is that calibrated thought promotes the perception that 
the decision maker engaged in the right amount of thinking about the decision. Study 2 directly 
investigated this possibility. Study 2 also had three additional goals: to gauge the robustness of 
the calibration effect by changing the decision domain; to directly examine whether calibrated 
thinking increases observers’ willingness to be influenced by the decision maker; and to modify 
our thoughtfulness manipulation—varying perceived effort with no mention of time.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
One hundred one participants from a national online pool read that they were 
participating in a survey about blackjack, a popular card game. Participants first watched a video Thought Calibration 11 
 
describing the rules of blackjack. For example, the video explained that the goal of blackjack is 
to beat a dealer’s hand without the sum of one’s cards exceeding 21, and instructed that players 
must decide to “hit” (accept another card) or “stay” (decline another card) after the dealer deals 
two cards to each player. Following the tutorial, participants read a vignette in which an 
individual named Steve was playing blackjack. After seeing Steve’s cards, participants read that 
he “hit,” and subsequently reported their perceptions of Steve, his decision, and his thought 
process. 
Independent Variables   
Decision type.  All participants saw the two cards dealt to Steve. We manipulated 
whether Steve’s decision was easy or difficult by varying those cards’ values. In the easy 
condition, Steve’s cards summed to a score of 5. The unambiguously correct decision here was 
to “hit,” because every card would bring Steve’s hand closer to 21 without exceeding it. In the 
difficult condition, Steve’s cards summed to a score of 15. In this case, the decision was 
complicated by the fact that a hit could lead to a bust, whereby the cards exceed 21 and the 
player loses. Thus, this decision was objectively more difficult. 
Decision thoughtfulness. We manipulated thoughtfulness by describing how much effort 
Steve devoted to his decision. In the high thought condition, participants read: “Steve puts a lot 
of thought into his decision. You can see that he thinks very hard about it.” In the low thought 
condition, participants read: “Steve does not put a lot of thought into his decision. You can see 
that he does not think very hard about it.”  
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Dependent Measures 
Thought calibration. Following the scenario description, participants indicated the extent 
to which they believed that Steve engaged in the right amount of thinking before making his 
decision. Participants responded on a 1-7 scale (not at all – very much). 
Liking. Participants reported liking using the same items as in Study 1 (α = .88). 
Openness to influence. Participants reported their openness to influence on three items: If 
Steve offered you his advice about how to play blackjack in the future, would you follow his 
advice? If Steve offered you his advice about how to play another gambling game, would you 
follow his advice? How much would you trust Steve to make good decisions in the future? 
Responses, provided on 1-7 point scales with higher values indicating greater openness to 
influence, were averaged (α = .91). 
At the conclusion of the survey, participants reported whether they considered themselves 
to be blackjack experts. Because experts’ familiarity with various decision rules (e.g., guidelines 
about when to hit) could interfere with the decision difficulty manipulation, we made an a priori 
decision to exclude them from our sample. Nine participants self-identified as experts, and these 
participants were excluded from analysis. Our results do not change in any meaningful way 
when these participants are retained.   
Results  
Thought Calibration   
  The thought calibration data revealed a main effect of decision type, F(1, 87) = 8.56, p < 
.01, but not thoughtfulness, F < 1 (Table 2). Most germane, the predicted interaction emerged, 
F(1, 87) = 36.04, p < .001. High thought fostered perceptions that the target engaged in the right Thought Calibration 13 
 
amount of thinking under difficult decision conditions, F(1, 87) = 20.00, p < .001, whereas low 
thought fostered these perceptions under easy decision conditions, F(1, 87) = 16.16, p < .001.
1   
Liking  
  On liking we found a main effect for thoughtfulness, F(1, 88) = 4.02, p < .05, but not 
decision type, F < 1. More importantly, the predicted interaction emerged, F(1, 88) = 18.00, p < 
.001. High thought fostered liking under difficult decision conditions, F(1, 88) = 19.52, p < .001, 
but there was a reverse tendency under easy decision conditions, F(1, 88) = 2.50, p < .12. 
We followed the procedures outlined by Hayes (2012) to examine whether calibration 
perceptions mediated the interaction between decision type and decision thoughtfulness on 
liking. As illustrated in Figure 1, perceived calibration mediated this interaction (CI: 1.33 to 
3.36).   
Openness to Influence 
 There were no main effects on openness to influence, Fs(1, 88) < 2.63, ps > .11, but 
again we found the predicted interaction, F(1, 88) = 32.40, p < .001. High (versus low) thought 
increased openness to influence under difficult decision conditions, F(1, 88) = 22.73, p < .001, 
whereas this effect reversed under easy decision conditions, F(1, 88) = 10.78, p = .001. 
Following the same method as above, we found that perceived calibration mediated this 
interaction (CI: 1.15 to 2.88). 
Study 3 
  The results of Studies 1-2 were consistent with our calibration hypothesis. However, both 
studies employed vignette paradigms that explicitly referenced decision thoughtfulness.  
Although such references do occur in the real world, it is possible that in our experimental 
context they introduce concerns about possible demand effects. Study 3 aimed to replicate our Thought Calibration 14 
 
findings using a non-vignette paradigm in which decision thoughtfulness was not explicitly 
stated. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Three hundred forty-seven participants from an online pool were told that their session 
would be synced online with that of another participant named Mark. Participants were then 
instructed that either they or Mark would be randomly assigned to decide which of two 
microwaves they would choose if they needed one. All participants read that Mark had been 
assigned to make the decision, that they and Mark would simultaneously examine the microwave 
choice set, and that they should view the options while Mark made his decision. Participants 
viewed the options on the next screen, and were told that their screen would advance once Mark 
clicked to indicate his decision. The microwave stimuli that appeared, and the decision difficulty 
manipulation, were identical to those from Study 1. 
To manipulate thoughtfulness, we varied the amount of time that Mark devoted to his 
decision (i.e., the time that the choice set was visible before the screen advanced). In the high 
versus low thoughtfulness conditions, the screen advanced after 90 and 15 seconds, respectively. 
A pilot study revealed that participants exposed to a 90-second wait (M = 4.81, SE = .12) 
perceived that the target devoted more thought to the decision than participants exposed to a 15-
second wait (M = 2.14, SE = .11), t(175) = 16.29, p < .001. 
After their screen advanced, participants learned that Mark chose Microwave 1. The 
supposed session sync was then deactivated and we assessed thought calibration, liking (α = .90), 
and openness to influence (α = .92), using identical measures to Study 2 but framed in terms of 
microwaves.  Thought Calibration 15 
 
Results
 
Thought Calibration 
  The thought calibration index revealed a main effect for decision type, F(1, 343) = 13.11, 
p < .001, but not thoughtfulness, F(1, 343) < 2.25, p > .14 (Table 3). Most important, the 
predicted interaction emerged, F(1, 343) = 24.43, p < .001. High thought increased perceived 
calibration under difficult decision conditions, F(1, 343) = 20.56, p < .001; low thought 
increased perceived calibration under easy decision conditions, F(1, 343) = 5.98, p < .05. 
Liking  
  The liking index revealed no main effects, Fs < 1.96, ps > .16, but we obtained the 
predicted interaction, F(1, 343) = 19.73, p < .001. High thought increased liking under difficult 
decision conditions, F(1, 343) = 8.35, p < .01; this effect reversed under easy decision 
conditions, F(1, 343) = 11.51, p = .001. Following the method described in Study 2, we found 
that perceived calibration mediated liking (CI: .34 to .85; Figure 2). 
Openness to Influence 
There were no main effects on openness to influence, Fs(1, 343) < 2.59, ps > .11, but 
there was an interaction, F(1, 343) = 17.18, p < .001. High (versus low) thought increased 
openness to influence under difficult decision conditions, F(1, 343) = 12.13, p = .001, whereas 
this effect reversed under easy decision conditions, F(1, 343) = 5.64, p < .05. Again, perceived 
calibration mediated this interaction (CI: .47 to 1.16). 
General Discussion 
People frequently observe others making decisions. Despite the ubiquity of these 
observations, little research has explored the impact of a target’s decision process—specifically, 
his or her thoughtfulness—on observers’ judgments, choices, and receptiveness to influence. Our Thought Calibration 16 
 
studies tested the hypothesis that individuals’ perceived decision quality, general appeal, and 
ability to influence can increase when they devote more or less thought to their decisions, 
depending on the context. Study 1 revealed that under difficult decision conditions, more rather 
than less thoughtfulness enhanced evaluations of the decision, the decision maker, and the 
chosen item. Under easy decision conditions, the opposite pattern emerged. Using different 
contexts and manipulations, Studies 2 and 3 replicated the core effects on perceived thought 
calibration, liking, and openness to influence. Thus, rather than having a fixed preference for 
individuals who devote more thought to their decisions or for individuals who rely on their 
immediate gut reactions, our results suggest that individuals who calibrate their thought process 
to the demands of the situation are better liked, more influential, and viewed as making better 
decisions.  
Interestingly, our studies revealed some variation in the strength of these opposing 
effects. Specifically, the effect of thoughtfulness tended to be stronger under difficult rather than 
easy conditions. It could be that there is a slightly greater preference for more thoughtfulness in 
general, which makes the optimal calibration level harder to pinpoint under easy decision 
conditions. Alternatively, perhaps the positive effect of low thought under easy conditions 
requires the perception that the target had prior knowledge or a strong gut feeling, neither of 
which were explicitly conveyed to participants in these studies.  While the simple effects under 
easy conditions were in the predicted direction in each study, the slight asymmetry in effects 
across easy and difficult conditions is worthy of further research.  
Also important, in this initial research we limited our examination to decision 
thoughtfulness, but there are numerous other decision process dimensions that could influence 
observers’ reactions to decision makers. For example, just as individuals can think more or less Thought Calibration 17 
 
about a decision, they can think more rationally or emotionally, more objectively or subjectively, 
more abstractly or concretely, and so on. Our calibration hypothesis could be extended to each of 
these processing dimensions to determine if people like others more, and are more open to their 
influence, when the type of thinking others apply to a decision matches observers’ perception of 
the context. In addition to affecting liking and influence through perceived calibration, as we 
found, these kinds of matches and mismatches might have more general implications for 
expectancy confirmation and violation, which also play a critical role in social perception and 
persuasion (e.g., Clary & Tesser, 1983; Reich & Tormala, 2013).  
Another possible limitation of the current research is that in each study thought 
calibration was likely salient to participants before they completed the liking and influence 
measures. In Studies 1-2, the target’s thoughtfulness was explicitly described in the materials. In 
Study 3, participants completed the thought calibration measure prior to the liking and influence 
items.  Is salience critical for the thought calibration effect to emerge?  Like most psychological 
constructs, we assume the effect of calibration is greater when it is salient. Nevertheless, an 
important direction for future research would be to explore whether these effects occur 
spontaneously or are constrained to contexts in which a decision maker’s thoughtfulness is 
particularly salient or explicit.   
Even if the effect is restricted to such contexts, we submit that it is still likely to be 
relevant to many social situations, because others’ decision thoughtfulness is indeed quite salient 
in many situations.  That is, there are a number of different contexts in which a decision maker’s 
thoughtfulness is explicitly referenced or likely to be salient for other reasons.  For instance, 
there is ample anecdotal evidence that consumers reference their own thoughtfulness in their 
online product reviews and testimonials (e.g., “I thought long and hard before buying this Thought Calibration 18 
 
machine”
2; “…I quickly decided on the turkey panini”
 3; “…took a long time to decide what to 
order…”
4; “I quickly decided on Ceviche…”
5; “I bought the Oreck Touch without much 
thought…”
6).  Moreover, third parties often explicitly describe the amount of thought that 
decision makers devote to their decisions (e.g., “He said there that he had ‘thought carefully’ 
about the decision and did not make it ‘lightly’ or ‘impulsively’”
 7; “…it took the jury just fifteen 
minutes to acquit the defendants” [Finkelman, 1985]).  
In addition to explicit references, there likely are general situational cues that attune 
people to others’ decision thoughtfulness.  For instance, when people must wait for others to 
make a decision before making their own (e.g., waiting for a customer ahead of them in line to 
place an order; waiting for a fellow diner at a restaurant to choose an entrée), they might be 
closely attuned to others’ thoughtfulness.  Likewise, in the recreational domain, people might 
attune to others’ thoughtfulness with some frequency.  For instance, in games involving timed 
decisions (e.g., chess, backgammon), or games in which players must wait for others to place 
bets before they do so themselves (e.g., poker, blackjack), people might be particularly sensitive 
to others’ thoughtfulness. In these and other situations, individuals might spontaneously reflect 
upon others’ thoughtfulness, and studying the current effects in these domains would be 
worthwhile.  
Finally, if calibration effects are constrained to situations in which the salience of a 
person’s thoughtfulness is high, the current findings may still have practical import in 
uncovering a novel means of persuasion. In particular, if one seeks to influence or be liked by 
others, calibrating one’s apparent thought process to the demands of the situation might be an 
effective means of doing so. For example, when creating political endorsements or other 
promotional materials that convey an individual’s decision process (e.g., “I checked out all of the Thought Calibration 19 
 
other options and knew that this was the right choice for me!”), explicitly referencing one’s 
thoughtfulness could meaningfully influence others’ reactions.  Our results suggest that 
recipients might make more positive inferences about endorsed items when they learn that the 
endorser engaged in the right amount of thinking before endorsing it.  Future studies testing this 
possibility would be worthwhile.   Thought Calibration 20 
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Table 1.  Experiment 1 measures as a function of decision type and thoughtfulness. 
 
 
 Easy  Decision  Difficult Decision 
  
Decision Thoughtfulness 
 
Dependent Measure 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
  
Decision Quality 
M 
SE 
 
 
4.70 
.21 
 
 
5.16 
.21 
 
 
4.92 
.23 
 
 
3.84 
.19 
 
Willingness-to-Pay 
M 
SE 
 
 
37.46 
6.48 
 
51.32 
6.48 
 
61.00 
6.86 
 
44.06 
5.79 
Liking
 
M 
SE 
 
 
3.91 
.15 
 
4.30 
.15 
 
4.24 
.16 
 
3.83 
.13 
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Table 2.  Experiment 2 measures as a function of decision type and thoughtfulness. 
 
 Easy  Decision  Difficult Decision 
  
Decision Thoughtfulness 
 
Dependent Measure 
 
High  
 
Low  
 
High  
 
Low  
  
Thought Calibration 
M 
SE 
 
 
3.87 
.46 
 
 
5.73 
.34 
 
 
4.87 
.22 
 
 
2.83 
.22 
 
Liking 
M 
SE 
 
 
3.86 
.17 
 
4.28 
.25 
 
4.56 
.16 
 
3.39 
.16 
Openness to Influence
 
M 
SE 
 
3.25 
.28 
 
4.30 
.24 
 
4.17 
.18 
 
2.64 
.20 
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Table 3.  Experiment 3 measures as a function of decision type and thoughtfulness. 
 
 Easy  Decision  Difficult Decision 
  
Decision Thoughtfulness 
 
Dependent Measure 
 
High  
 
Low  
 
High  
 
Low  
  
Thought Calibration 
M 
SE 
 
 
4.71 
.20 
 
5.31 
.15 
 
4.94 
.17 
 
3.81 
.18 
Liking 
M 
SE 
 
 
4.01 
.12 
 
4.54 
.09 
 
4.34 
.11 
 
3.89 
.12 
Openness to Influence
 
M 
SE 
 
3.91 
.13 
 
4.38 
.12 
 
4.27 
.15 
 
3.57 
.16 
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Figure 1.  Experiment 2 mediation models for liking (top panel) and openness to influence 
(bottom panel). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note. The path coefficients are unstandardized betas. Values in parentheses indicate the effect of 
the interaction on the dependent variable after controlling for the mediator.  *p<.05   **p<.01   
***p<.001 
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3.90***  .49*** 
(.65) 
 2.56*** 
Thoughtfulness x 
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Figure 2.  Experiment 3 mediation models for liking (top panel) and openness to influence 
(bottom panel). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The path coefficients are unstandardized betas. Values in parentheses indicate the effect of 
the interaction on the dependent variable after controlling for the mediator.  *p<.05   **p<.01   
***p<.001 
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(.41*) 
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1.74***  .46*** 
(.38) 
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Thoughtfulness x 
Difficulty 
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Notes 
1. Variation in degrees of freedom stem from missing data on the calibration item from one 
participant. 
2. http://www.amazon.com/Philips-CDR600-CD-Recorder/product-reviews/B00005AY8K 
 
3. http://www.yelp.com/biz/boxed-foods-company-san-francisco 
 
4. http://www.yelp.com/biz/song-ngu-restaurant-milpitas-2?start=80 
 
5. http://www.yelp.com/biz/the-mezzanine-at-st-germain-san-juan 
 
6. http://www.amazon.com/Oreck-Touch-Upright-Bagless-BU10000/product-
reviews/B00BI3H772 
 
7. http://www.sanluisobispo.com/2013/01/18/2361249/bruce-gibson-affair-cherie-aispuro.html 
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Appendix A 
 
Easy Decision Condition 
 
Microwave Oven 1    Microwave Oven 2 
 
Color: Dark Gray     Color: Light Gray 
27-key touchpad control     27-key touchpad control 
10 power levels      10 power levels  
Turntable cooking system     Turntable cooking system  
Auto weight defrost     Auto weight defrost  
Automatic popcorn setting    Automatic popcorn setting 
Hold warm    Hold warm 
 
Difficult Decision Condition 
 
Microwave Oven 1    Microwave Oven 2 
 
Color: Dark Gray     Color: Light Gray 
27-key touchpad control     1.6 cubic-foot capacity 
10 power levels      11.63-inch carousel turntable  
Turntable cooking system     Auto-Touch control panel  
Auto weight defrost     11 Instant Action keys  
Automatic popcorn setting    Electronic child lock 
Hold warm    Minute Plus Single Touch 
 
 
 
 
 
 